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LOST VOTERS: PARTICIPATION IN EU ELECTIONS  
AND THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY VOTING  
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 317/JULY 2009 
ANTHOULA MALKOPOULOU
* 
Introduction 
The most recent elections to the European Parliament were conducted on 4 to 7 June 2009. As 
with most of the previous elections, it seems that attention was directed more to the problem of 
low voter turnout than to the political outcome. All media sources reported on the turnout, some 
(Michaels, 2009) calling it a ‘failure for Brussels’. Undoubtedly, the decrease in electoral 
participation is a disturbing trend, affecting the EU’s internal and external image. Among 
possible remedies for apathy, the most immediate would be to penalise abstention. Such a 
course of action is naturally controversial, on moral, political and technical grounds. This paper 
discusses these issues by drawing on existing practices and discourses in various countries. As 
well as illustrating the positive and negative aspects of compulsory voting, the main aim is to 
explore the real possibility of such a reform in the EU. 
Why does turnout matter? 
Participation in the EU elections has been constantly decreasing from 62% in 1979 to 43% in 
2009. In the seven direct elections to the European Parliament so far, the turnout has fallen by 
an average of 3% each time, the largest drop occurring in the 1999 elections (7%). Of course, 
voter abstention is a common phenomenon in many countries around the world, more so in 
Western Europe, the USA, Canada and Japan. In the past, some electoral scholars (Morris-
Jones, 1954) have argued that a low turnout is not necessarily a bad thing. It might even be 
considered as an indication of voter satisfaction and trust in the established system. This view, 
however, is rather out of step with the growing demand for participatory democracy in today’s 
world. 
As far as the EU elections are concerned, there are two basic reasons why turnout matters. First, 
abstention from the polls notably diminishes the legitimacy of the electoral process, of the 
European Parliament itself and of the European Union as a whole. In this way, the vision of 
consolidating the Union as a democratic project that culminated in direct suffrage to the 
Parliament in 1979 is undermined. Especially so since the EU’s internal application of 
democratic standards is being challenged on another front these days, namely the questionable 
procedures of adopting the EU Treaty of Lisbon, with referenda being repeated until the results 
are satisfactory. Even though Europe does not share a common culture of direct democracy and 
there are different views on the levels of EU representation, this disharmony has affected the 
sense of political equality in the EU. As a result, an increasing divide opens up between 
Europe’s democratic ideals and its less democratic reality, in which the concepts of 
representation, majority and equal empowerment are distorted. These ideas lie at the heart of 
European history and political culture, and have generated stability, trust and social peace. 
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Secondly, the EU needs credibility for its democracy promotion projects. In the eyes of the 
world, the EU is indeed the largest humanitarian aid provider. With respect to other donors, it 
adopts a distinct aid strategy that strictly applies the principles of democracy and human rights. 
These principles, having their origin in the historical experience of war and military regimes in 
Europe during the last century, provide an uncontested common ground of conceptual 
understanding between Europeans. They produce a convergence of political attitudes that unites 
all member states and crafts a supra-national identity, an image that is projected to the rest of the 
world. Human rights and democracy appear not only as general thematic priorities that 
mainstream development projects, but also as specific legal clauses that determine the 
conclusion of aid contracts. Therefore, the EU simply cannot afford to be criticised for the 
quality of its own democratic record. Participation and political inclusion are part and parcel of 
the democratic package and if the EU wants to support that package worldwide, it must adhere 
to these values itself.  
Figure 1. Average turnout at European elections 
 
 
 
Source: TNS opinion, in collaboration with the EP. 
 
Voter turnout in EU elections 
The declining levels of participation in the elections to the US Congress present a parallel to the 
EP elections. Since 1979, the turnout percentage for both has been gradually falling, with the 
biggest slump seen in the 1990s. Such evidence suggests that among other things, voters are less 
willing to extend their support for second-order elections, i.e. elections that seem less important 
than EU member-state national elections or US presidential elections. From this point of view 
the experience of the EP seems similar to that of the US Congress.  LOST VOTERS: THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY VOTING IN EU ELECTIONS | 3 
 
Figure 2. Voter turnout in US Congressional and European Parliament elections 
 
 
Data Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 
 
In most EU states, including all new members (except Malta, Cyprus and Lithuania) and most 
of the old ones (except Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Italy and Ireland), turnout in the 2004 
EU elections was half of that registered in their respective national elections (IDEA). Indeed, a 
comparison with ‘first-order’ elections indicates that, when it comes to EU elections, the ceiling 
for campaign expenses is often lower, while the campaign periods are shorter, less lively and 
focused mainly on domestic issues, often outside the real competences of the future MEPs. In 
many cases, campaigns are not run by the MEP candidates themselves, but by party leaders – as 
in Greece – or other frontbenchers of parliamentary groups, who might not be competent 
enough to communicate EU issues. 
If the nature of campaigning is one reason for abstention, another is the timing of the elections. 
As a matter of fact, the tendency to go to the polls decreases when the frequency of election 
contests increases. Hence, a low turnout in Slovenia was not very surprising, since the EU poll 
took place only nine months after the general elections (September 2008) and one year before 
the upcoming municipal elections (scheduled in 2010). 
The polling date also plays a role, given the supra-national scale of EU elections. A rather 
discouraging factor has been the preference for the month of June, when school and university 
holidays begin in northern states. A European Parliament proposal pending since 1998 
(Anastassopoulos Report, repeated in the 2006 Duff Report), to bring forward the elections from 
June to May has never been followed-up. 
In any case, the prime deterrent to EU voters is not so much linked to the electoral procedure 
itself, but more to their lack of conviction that their vote can affect the course of public policy. 
Disengagement from the elections comes from the realisation that the European Parliament 
plays a secondary and rather complicated role in EU decision-making. More often than not, 
voters feel ‘lost’ in the EU institutional labyrinth, which fragments political power and blurs 
government accountability. In other words, voters abstain from electing EU representatives 
because the EU institutions were never adequately explained to them. This will only change 
through systematic educational efforts that go beyond the election period. If not, even after the 
expected empowerment of the European Parliament with the Lisbon Treaty when the result of 4 | ANTHOULA MALKOPOULOU 
 
the vote will hold more sway over political decisions, national elections will probably still retain 
their primacy over European elections.  
The common perception that ‘Brussels is far away’ further illustrates a general lack of 
knowledge about the EU’s institutional structure, which appears too complicated and 
inaccessible. This is evident in the European Parliament’s agenda, which features very technical 
issues (most often referred to as the ‘size of strawberries’) that seem to have little connection 
with the daily life of EU citizens. The second is of course only an illusion, since more than half 
of the member states’ legislation is decided at EU level. But that does not dispel the voters’ 
sense of detachment from what they understand to be an alien super-state.  
This disillusionment is often sustained by a sense that the EU institutions are stealing power 
from the national representative bodies. In some cases, the small national delegations of MEPs 
result in a feeling of under-representation for the electors from small countries, due to the large 
size of the Union’s electorate. The politics of euro-scepticism, which questions the importance 
of EU integration against the primacy of national interests, further fuels these abstention-
friendly attitudes, especially in the northern states, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland. 
Finally, participation in elections is undermined by the increase of alternative types of 
politicisation. These can take the form of lobbying activities and civil society activism, 
especially in the case of the EU. Non-governmental organisations often compete with political 
parties for public attention and membership, and systematically portray elections as too passive 
a form of political participation. This only adds to the perception that EU parties are rigid 
structures with an old-fashioned working style, which prevents them from moving flexibly 
across national borders and reaching out to a European audience. Interest groups are growing in 
influence compared to political parties, turning the EU’s participation and deliberation 
initiatives into a channel for corporations to capture decision-making. Consequently, European 
democracy remains in limbo, as electoral legitimacy seems to lose ground to the increasing 
impact of lobbying activities. 
Table 1. Turnout at the EU Elections in the 27 member states 
 
  1979  1981  1984  1987  1989  1994  1995  1996  1999  2004  2007  2009 
  BE  91.36   92.09   90.73  90.66    91.05  90.81   90.39 
  DK  47.82    52.38    46.17  52.92      50.46  47.89    59.54 
  DE  65.73   56.76   62.28  60.02    45.19  43   43.3 
  IE  63.61    47.56    68.28  43.98      50.21  58.58    58.64 
  FR  60.71   56.72   48.8  52.71    46.76  42.76   40.63 
  IT  85.65    82.47    81.07  73.6      69.76  71.72    65.05 
  LU  88.91   88.79   87.39  88.55    87.27  91.35   90.75 
  NL  58.12    50.88    47.48  35.69      30.02  39.26    36.75 
  UK  32.35   32.57   36.37  36.43    24  38.52   34.7 
  EL    81.48  80.59    80.03  73.18      70.25  63.22    52.61 
  ES     68.52  54.71  59.14    63.05  45.14   44.9 
  PT        72.42  51.1  35.54      39.93  38.6    36.78 
  SE        41.63   38.84  37.85   45.53 
  AT                67.73  49.4  42.43    45.97 
  FI         57.6  30.14  39.43   40.3 
  CZ                    28.3    28.2 LOST VOTERS: THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY VOTING IN EU ELECTIONS | 5 
 
  EE           26.83   43.9 
  CY                    72.5    59.4 
  LT           48.38   20.98 
  LV                    41.34    53.7 
  HU           38.5   36.31 
  MT                    82.39    78.79 
  PL           20.87   24.53 
  SI                    28.35    28.33 
  SK           16.97   19.64 
  BG                      29.22  38.99 
  RO            29.47  27.67 
  EU total  61.99    58.98    58.41  56.67      49.51  45.47    43 
 
Source: TNS opinion, in collaboration with the EP. 
Nevertheless, even if the average voter turnout in these and previous EU elections has been 
declining, the picture varies among member states. In 2009, participation rates were lower in the 
twelve new EU members (38%), compared to the 15 old member states (52%). Results in 2004 
provided a similar picture. Back then it was argued that participation was low because the EU 
elections were held only one month after accession, when citizens of the new member states had 
not yet been informed about the role of the EU elections. However, the trend did not change in 
2009, and Slovakia and Lithuania showed the lowest turnout with 20 and 21% respectively.  
Moreover, when we take out the two non-Eastern new member states, the average percentage in 
the ten new Eastern Europe member states drops immediately to 32%.
1 In fact, the relatively 
high participation in Malta and Cyprus,
2 suggests that the differences in turnout are not between 
the old and new EU member states, but rather between West and East European electoral 
traditions. This observation is further sustained by the fact that in East European member-states, 
voter turnout in national elections too is on average lower than in Western Europe. 
Efforts to increase electoral participation 
As long as the administration of the EU elections is run by each member state according to 
national rules, there is little room for manoeuvre left to the European Parliament, at least in 
terms of reforming the rules for voting. As a result, when the EP’s Constitutional Affairs 
Committee put forward some proposals to boost participation in the 2009 elections, their impact 
was minimal. Aiming to address the fact that many EU citizens are disenfranchised because 
they have moved within the EU, the Committee confined itself to revising Directive 93/109, 
which lays down the conditions to vote and stand as a candidate in EU elections in any EU 
country (European Parliament, 2007). In other words, it simplified the bureaucratic procedures 
for registering voters and candidates in EU states of residence regardless of EU country of 
origin. It also underlined the possibility to stand as a candidate in more than one member state 
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for the same election, as long as the member states had no objection under their national laws to 
multiple candidatures. Although these are both very legitimate concerns, they have a marginal 
impact on absolute numbers, since, according to the subsequent report (European Parliament, 
2008), the number of mobile EU citizens eligible to vote in the state of residence is very low 
compared to those who reside and vote in the same state (2% of the EU’s total population).  
Being restricted with regard to institutional changes, in order to increase turnout in the 2009 
elections the European Parliament resorted to an elaborate communication strategy. With the 
aim of creating a unified public space, €18 million – which corresponds to 5 cents per eligible 
voter – were spent in an EU-wide promotional campaign to spread information on the elections 
(European Parliament, 2009a). The campaign included TV and radio spots, 15,000 billboards 
displayed in major European cities, posters and other material (European Parliament, 2009b), 
street installations, choice boxes, seminars, outdoor campaigning, websites, social networking 
and so on. Additional election communication funds were allocated by the European 
Commission, in what was seen as the most expensive voter-awareness campaign ever launched 
by Brussels.  
Spending tax-payers’ money to boost turnout is generally a new phenomenon for continental 
democracies. Sweden is an exception, as it allocates special funding for information purposes to 
domestic political parties (Government Communication, 2003). Otherwise, the EU public is 
more used to standard campaign spending from political parties and, therefore, parties are 
considered to be the main agents responsible for getting out the vote. Indeed, many political 
parties addressed the problem of abstention and made extra efforts to raise voter awareness in 
the 2009 campaign. But, given the time and expense constraints, many focused on mobilising 
only their safe electorates. At least in one case, a serious effort was made to attract young and 
disengaged voters, with the Pirate Party in Sweden making a breakthrough and raising the 2004 
turnout by a considerable 8%.  
For all the efforts to increase turnout, the only ‘positive’ evaluation is nevertheless a negative 
one: compared to the turnout of 2004, the decrease in 2009 was not too great. If in 2004 the 
turnout had fallen by 4% and in 1999 by 7% compared to their respective previous elections, the 
latest 2% decrease offers some slight consolation. However, it remains a fact that less than one 
in two EU voters bothered to elect representatives to the European Parliament in early June. The 
figures point to how ineffective the Parliament’s communication strategy was. To improve it 
would cost more money and many citizens are simply unwilling to pay. Hence, attention is 
turning to institutional remedies, which, for the moment, largely fall within the jurisdiction of 
each member state.  
A practice that is common in many states, especially for referenda, is the turnout requirement. It 
originated in the USSR, where an election was considered invalid and held anew if it failed to 
meet a certain turnout threshold. Similar rules still exist today in several ex-Soviet states, like 
Moldova and Hungary, where at least 50% of electors have to participate to make elections 
valid (Birch, 2009). They also apply for referendums in Lithuania, Slovenia, Croatia and 
Bosnia, sometimes sponsored from abroad, like the EU request for a minimum 50% turnout on 
Montenegrin independence. In some cases, the turnout requirement has been lowered or 
removed. For example, it was cancelled in Serbia after three failed attempts to elect a new 
President in the years 2002-2004. In order to avoid a Serbian style institutional deadlock, in 
2006 the Russian Duma decided to lift these requirements and only keep a 20% minimum for 
referenda, while the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia lowered the threshold from 50% 
to 40% some months ago (January 2009). Albeit drastic and very effective, this practice is less 
known in Western Europe and, therefore, not very likely to succeed.  
A common tactic to increase turnout is hold other elections on the same day as EU elections. 
This in part explains the relatively high turnout in Lithuania in 2004, when EU elections LOST VOTERS: THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY VOTING IN EU ELECTIONS | 7 
 
coincided with presidential elections and the dramatic drop in this country’s turnout in 2009 
when no other elections were held concurrently. This year, simultaneous national elections were 
held only in Luxembourg, while seven other states held a simultaneous election to the local 
administration. The impact on turnout was particularly noticeable in Latvia (53,7%) and 
Denmark (59,54%), where the referendum on the very popular Danish Act of Succession had an 
impressive impact on EU voter turnout. As a result, a synchronisation of the EU election day 
with other important national polls is a first positive step towards increasing turnout. 
Other examples with remarkable participation rates include Malta (78,79%) and Ireland 
(58,64%). Both countries use a special electoral system, the Single Transferable Vote, which is 
highly proportional and therefore attracts more voters to the polls. However, counting is 
notoriously long and complicated, with election officers recruiting mathematically adept 
citizens from chess clubs to help them determine the results!
3  
Two other solutions could include civic education and lower voting ages. The case of Sweden 
shows that trust in the system and good civic education projects can ultimately bring about high 
turnouts, at least with regard to national elections. This however, is not automatically extended 
to EU elections, unless there is specific and targeted training over a longer period of time. 
Extending voting rights to 16 year-olds would also have doubtful results on participation rates, 
since younger age groups are generally less prone to turn out at the polls. 
Furthermore, Estonia experimented with e-voting, increasing participation by an impressive 
17%, from 26,83% to 43,9%. Other countries are reluctant to follow their example, however for 
three main reasons. The first is that an electronic upgrade of electoral administration would 
require considerable financial resources and a dependence on service (hardware/software) 
providers. Secondly, concerns about technology security are still widespread in many EU 
countries and have indefinitely halted the use of electronic voting devices. Thirdly, the levels of 
internet penetration in households and digital literacy are likely to produce unequal access to e-
voting and thus to increase inequality in political representation. 
EU states employ a number of other technical and policy means to facilitate public participation 
in elections. They include voting by mail (Germany), by proxy (the Netherlands), by messenger 
(Sweden) or in advance (Sweden, Finland, Lithuania). Other experimental means of 
encouraging the act of voting are to provide a wide choice of polling stations or to offer 
financial or other incentives to voters. However, the effectiveness of these techniques has been 
very limited and their impact on voter turnout leaves much to be desired.   
The most efficient and cost-effective mechanism to improve turnout is compulsory voting, as 
shown by the countries with the highest turnout scores in the EU, Four EU countries are, in one 
way or another, applying such laws: Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and Cyprus, all have 
turnout rates that range from 53% to 91%. The Netherlands, Austria and Italy also used to have 
the same system in the past; indeed, Italy’s high voter participation (65% in EU2009) shows that 
the country still reaps the fruits of its long-standing participatory tradition. 
Although the recent removal or mitigation of severe sanctions for abstainers makes for a 
decreasing trend in the enforcement of compulsory voting, a few other countries have taken the 
opposite direction of late and expressed an interest in introducing it. In 2001 in the United 
Kingdom, a Compulsory Voting Bill was sponsored by the Labour Party. Public support has 
supposedly remained rather high since, at between 36% and 49% (Electoral Commission, 2006). 
Much more recently, in spring 2008, the topic was raised again in the French Assembly (Sénat, 
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2003; Assemblée, 2008).  The law proposal, submitted by a group of 25 deputies from the ruling 
centre-right party, came as a reaction to the decreasing participation in local elections.  
In the aftermath of the 2009 EU elections, the idea of raising participation by punishing 
abstainers seems to be more and more appealing. German MP Jörn Thießen (SDP) suggested a 
fine of €50 for non-voters, arguing that “democracy does not work without democrats” (Der 
Spiegel, 2009). He adds that politicians too are sometimes obliged to vote in the Parliament; 
thus, the same obligation should be extended to citizens. Earlier, elected French MEP Pervenche 
Beres (PS) made a similar appeal. She claimed that obligatory taxation provided a model for 
obligatory voting (Euronews, 2009). In light of these and other arguments for and against 
compulsory voting, the details of such a system are certainly worth consideration, especially 
since it is imperative to search for new tools to counter voter abstention. 
Compulsory voting: How does it work? 
Voting is by law mandatory in no less than 27 countries. This pool consists of 7 European 
countries,
4 6 countries in South-East Asia and 14 in Central and Latin America. Some of them 
mention the rule in their constitutions, most of them in their electoral laws, and half of them also 
provide for a system of implementation.  
The most notable example of a country that effectively enforces compulsory voting today is 
Australia. The enforcement is rather lenient, as non-voters are first invited to provide a “valid 
and sufficient” explanation for their absence. This may be “physical obstruction, whether of 
sickness or outside prevention, or of natural events, or accident of any kind” (Election 
Commission, 2007). Only when this request is not satisfied are non-voters fined. The price to 
pay is AUD20 (approx. €10) and, in case of non-compliance, it rises to AUD50 (approx. €25). 
This can either be replaced by court attendance or further transformed into criminal sanctions 
(Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1918). Only those who are abroad on election-day are 
exempted. Even with such small fines, the Australian turnout from 1946 until 2007 has been 
mostly around 95% (IDEA). The main objections raised against the system are that the 
implementation entails high costs and too many administrative resources. 
The system seems to work better in the Swiss canton of Schaffhausen, which combines very low 
fines with an extensive list of acceptable reasons for no-show at the polls (Electoral Law, 1904). 
These include seniority (over 65 years) and absence due to a) military or civil service b) 
professional or family grounds c) illness d) serious illness of a close relative e) an eight-day 
period of mourning and f) holidays. In addition, the small German-speaking region of 74,000 
inhabitants uses an almost automatic system to follow-up non-voters. It applies minimum fines 
of CHF3 (approx. €2) with a system of distribution that does not involve too many staff 
resources: after elections, police officers visit residences and re-collect each citizen’s voter card, 
on which is marked who has voted and who has not. 
Within the EU, the most pronounced example of compulsory poll attendance is Belgium. 
According to election law, abstaining voters are subject to progressive fines, which become 
higher with the number of elections missed. They start from €25-50 for the first time and can 
rise to €50-125 for the second abstention. Those who abstain for a fourth time are also subject to 
temporary disenfranchisement and ineligibility for public office (Constitution, 1893; Electoral 
Law, 1894). Exempted are Belgian citizens abroad and EU and third-country nationals in local 
elections. The Belgian system seems to be taking an increasingly flexible line with non-voters 
and has made additions to the list of acceptable reasons for non-voting. Consequently, the 
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increase of infrastructural facilitations for casting ballots and the lack of sufficient judicial staff 
resources to handle abstention cases has made prosecution less likely in effect. 
In Cyprus and Luxembourg, the fines are higher, but there is little evidence of enforcement, 
with no single prosecution ever being reported in Luxembourg. Abstainers are asked to pay a 
maximum of CYP200 (approx. €342) (Election Law, 1979) and €1,000 respectively (Election 
Law, 2003). Among other reasons, non-punishment results from the unpopular and 
disproportionately high fines and the cumbersome administration of their collection. In the latest 
discussion over the issue in 2008, the Cypriot Parliament decided to replace the judicial route of 
punishment with a direct and simple fine, in order to make prosecution more realisable (Politis, 
2008). Despite this lax application, participation levels are extremely high in both countries; 
around 80 and 90% or higher. 
In Greece too, no enforcement system is in place. Yet the election law clearly stipulates 
sanctions for non-voting that entail imprisonment or deprivation of public office (Constitution, 
2001; Election Law, 2007).
5 Although no implementation mechanisms are in place and 
compulsory voting exists only in abstracto, participation rates (around 80%) are still higher 
there than in the rest of the EU, the recent 53% being the lowest ever recorded. The same is true 
for Italy, which abolished the law in 1993. Hence, in most cases, even when enforcement is very 
lax or absent, the system seems to work. Surprisingly, voters still tend to adhere to the rule, not 
really for fear of punishment, but rather driven by popular belief or political custom. 
Table 2. West European countries with compulsory voting in the past or at present (level of 
enforcement as of May 2009; fines have been converted into euro) 
COUNTRY PUNISHMENT  ENFORCEMENT  LEGISLATION  DATE 
Switzerland 
(Schaffhausen)  Fine 2 EUR  Strict 
Elect. Law,  
Art. 9-10 
1852- 
Australia  Fine 10-25 EUR + 
criminal sanctions  Strict  Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918  1924- 
Belgium Fine  25-125  EUR  Intermediate  Constitution, Art.62 / 
Elect.Law Art.207-210  1893- 
Cyprus  Fine 342 EUR 
(maximum)  Weak  Elect.Law Art.7(2), 
Art.37  1960 
Luxembourg  Fine 100-1000 
EUR  None  Elect. Law Art.90  1918- 
Greece 
Imprisonment 1-12 
months + 
deprivation of 
public offices and 
municipal positions 
None 
Constitution Art.51 (5) 
/ Elect.Law Art.6 (2), 
117 (1,2) 
1926- 
Austria 
(presidential) 
- Styria  
- Carinthia  
- Tyrol 
- Voralberg 
- 
Abolished in 1982 
 
Abolished in 1992 
Abolished in 1992 
Abolished in 2004 
Abolished in 2004 
- 
1929-
2004 
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Netherlands -  Abolished  in  1967  -  1917-
1967 
Italy -  Abolished  in  1993  -  1946-
1993 
 
Arguments in favour  
Despite the many problems of enforcement, a number of scholars, policy-makers and voters 
worldwide continue to believe that compulsory voting is a good thing. Besides the obvious 
reason of increasing participation in elections, they defend it on many more grounds, theoretical 
and technical. In short, full participation prevents electoral corruption and promotes political 
integration and equal influence on the electoral outcome. In comparison to other means of 
boosting voter turnout, compulsory voting is the most effective measure; it decreases campaign 
spending, increases the income of the electoral administration and functions as an indirect tool 
for civic education. 
Compulsory voting was introduced for the first time on a national scale in Belgium in 1893. A 
rather technical reason at that time was to protect poor voters from forced abstention, i.e. 
negative vote-buying, by their employers. Although this is not an issue in most European 
countries today, it may still be a useful mechanism to prevent electoral corruption and 
abstention-buying in countries that feature large economic divides and labour dependence.  
The main rationale behind the system in Belgium was to complement and enforce universal 
suffrage, which was introduced in the same constitutional reform of 1893. Compulsory voting 
was a way to fulfil the principle of political integration, in other words it was a method to 
politically unite a socially disparate people. In this sense, if the principle of universality is a 
central aspect of voting rights, its progressive realisation requires respect from the state and 
protection from third-party interference. As with all human rights, the third and most advanced 
step is fulfilling such rights, in other words providing guarantees that they will be exercised.  
So, full political integration is perhaps the strongest argument for compulsory voting. Indeed, 
the most important implication of universal participation is political equality. In his milestone 
article in 1997, Arend Lijphart argued that low turnout is biased against citizens with a lower 
education, income and social class. According to him, citizens with lower education or modest 
social status, as well as those belonging to ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities, are more 
prone to abstention than others. Conversely, voluntary voting perpetuates political inequalities 
and misrepresentation. Paradoxically, the claim of abstainers that the European Parliament is an 
elitist establishment is reinforced by abstention itself. 
Turnout inequalities are reflected in the outcome of the election and in public policies; thus who 
votes and who doesn’t has important consequences for who gets elected to shape public 
policies. Consequently, mandatory voting creates equal influence on the policy output and 
encourages actions that collectively address the total electorate. In this context, it has been 
suggested by political economists that it may even contribute to a more equal income 
distribution (Chong and Olivera, 2008). 
In a democratic state, the input from citizens is a fundamental factor of its legitimacy. 
According to the French bill of 2008, mandatory voting ensures “a clear expression of the 
collective will, the legitimacy of the elected and the representativity of the institutions”. Under 
normal conditions, electoral participation empowers the citizens and democratises the 
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representation, because the concept of majority does not correspond to real figures unless it is 
calculated on the basis of the full electorate. 
Therefore, voting has been considered a moral imperative for centuries, in other words a civic 
duty. As such, mandatory voting is morally justified, alongside existing civic obligations like 
jury service, tax payment, military conscription, compulsory school attendance and general 
obedience to the law. It applies Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
states that “rights and freedoms” are subject to “duties to the community”, including the “just 
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society” (cited in 
Evans, 2006). Conversely, Lijphart calls those who abstain from elections selfish and immoral 
free riders (p.11).  
In addition, according to the Australian Election Commission, mandatory voting “teaches the 
benefits of political participation” (Evans, 2006). It furthers civic education through actual 
practice and therefore creates immediate political awareness and civic engagement. It also 
presumably increases the frequency of political discussion and citizens’ knowledge of politics 
(Milazzo, 2008). In other words, urging citizens to vote serves as an excellent tool for 
deliberation and politicisation. 
Mandatory voting also offers some advantages for election finances. It is said to improve the 
quality of campaigning, as candidates can concentrate on issues rather than on encouraging 
voters to attend the polls. In this sense, it also decreases campaign spending and completely 
eliminates the need to invest in voter awareness. What is more, as the Swiss case demonstrates, 
mandatory voting can create significant income for the state administration (Gratschew, 2008). 
For example, even if the fines are low in Schaffhausen, the frequency of elections and referenda 
per year and the high number of citizens who do not show up without providing justification 
raises considerable sums that give a small injection to the public budget. Such revenues could be 
recycled as state subsidies for political parties.  
Arguments against 
No system is perfect of course, especially when it comes to electoral administration. Opponents 
of compulsory voting have identified several disadvantages of both a moral and technical 
nature. Starting with the political bias of such a reform and its anti-liberal nature, they continue 
with criticism of the technicalities of enforcement and its impact on the quality of the vote.   
It is true that, like most electoral reforms, the new system creates political advantages for certain 
political groups. When it was introduced in Belgium, the Catholic Party saw it as a tool to 
secure votes from its conservative grass roots, in order to defeat the more polarised socialists. 
Today, in the United Kingdom, as well as in Australia, the system is considered to be largely 
beneficial for the Labour parties (Mackerras and McAllister, 1999).  
Other opponents claim that compulsory voting is difficult and expensive to enforce. They draw 
on the existing state of the art, where half of the states with compulsory voting laws today do 
not have serious enforcement mechanisms. This happens because the judicial resources are not 
sufficient to deal with the thousands of cases (e.g. Argentina and elsewhere), or because the 
costs incurred by the administration for sanctioning non-voters is too high. A law that exists 
only in name but not in reality discredits the legal system. 
A third objection to compulsory voting, and perhaps the most serious one, is that it violates the 
principle of liberty, which is one of the core elements of democracy. For this reason, more often 
than not, the measure is attacked as being undemocratic and coercive. Libertarians claim that 
they have the right to disagree on the value of political participation as such. They furthermore 
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2008). On these grounds, compulsory voting is charged with violating basic human rights, 
namely the “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” (Art. 9 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights). However, in the case of X v Austria (Application No. 4982/71) in 1971, the 
European Court of Human Rights ruled that mandatory voting does not violate fundamental 
freedoms, because only attendance at a polling station – and not voting itself – is compulsory, 
while the voters also have the option of casting a blank or spoiled ballot paper (cited in Baston 
and Ritchie, 2004).  
The opt-out of the blank ballot was especially emphasised in the 2008 French bill as a form of 
legitimate conscientious objection. But for the opponents it raised yet another negative issue. It 
has been observed that in systems of compulsory voting there is a surplus of spoiled or blank 
ballots, as well as a high probability of casting ill-considered votes. This has consequences not 
only for the quality of the vote, but sometimes also for the electoral outcome. 
Another problem is that, despite technical guarantees like the possibility of casting a blank 
ballot, without due care, the system is subject to abuse. For example, in Greece during the Cold 
War, the Communist Party was outlawed by the government, and compulsory voting – as 
enforced through the control of stamped voting cards – specifically targeted the ‘enemies of the 
regime’. In some Latin American countries, illiterate voters are exempted from the obligation to 
vote. In Singapore the system is not useful, since voting is only mandatory for a few contested 
seats, while the rest are controlled by the governing party (Hill, 2002).  
In undemocratic regimes it is often the case that political and social pressure, intimidation or 
other means drive people to the polls. This was the case in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
and still occurs in Central Asia and North Korea. Because the obligation to vote is synonymous 
with negative experiences in these countries, support for compulsory voting reform is naturally 
very low. In general, as liberal principles and individualism gain ground, it is more difficult to 
make voting obligatory now than it was in the past (Gratschew, 2004). 
Compulsory voting in the EU 
Nevertheless, there are three main reasons why mandatory voting is a particularly appropriate 
solution for the European Parliament elections. First, as the Parliament struggles to acquire a 
stronger role vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council, it should protect its raison d’être as an 
institution that represents the EU citizens. Making voting compulsory would boost the turnout 
and allow the Parliament to lay claim to an ’input legitimacy’ that is missing from the two other 
EU institutions. In response to the increase of its powers through the Lisbon Treaty, it must 
become very clear that the Parliament is the most representative of the three EU governing 
institutions. It must therefore adopt a more inclusive character and reflect a fair share of the EU 
population.  
Second, this solution would recreate the EU electorate as a unified political body and add new 
dimensions to EU citizenship. Full participation in the EU elections would raise political 
debates from a national to a European level. In this way, it would distract voters from the 
narrow national context and elevate them into a European public sphere. Electoral obligation 
could lead to an increased awareness and interest in European issues and, as a result, create a 
distinct EU-mindedness. In other words, compelling citizens to vote could work as a costless 
civic education measure. And, as a side-effect, it would eliminate the expense of election 
promotion and raise voter awareness. 
A third positive effect would be a harmonisation of the political landscape. First of all, with the 
present system of voluntary voting, political parties that maintain electoral clienteles, through 
family or community ties, have a competitive advantage in the electoral contest. In this way the 
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electoral outcome currently depends on the eagerness to vote, which is usually higher in the 
extreme wings of the political spectrum, technically it is no surprise that far-right euro-sceptic 
parties are on the rise in the European Parliament. As stated above, low turnouts distort the 
concept of majority and offer an advantage to parties that would otherwise constitute an 
insignificant minority. The new system would eventually minimise the influence of extreme 
right parties and legitimate the shares between the different political groups. In fact, the 
European Parliament deserves a higher degree of procedural representation in order to avoid 
becoming hostage to eccentric political views. 
The prevailing political culture to some extent explains why the European Parliament has so far 
never discussed the option of mandatory voting, neither in a plenary session nor in the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee. Normally, amending electoral rights would require an inter-
governmental conference, like the one preceding the Maastricht Treaty, which made it possible 
for EU citizens to vote in all member states of the EU. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council 
can decide on a new treaty without having to resort to a formal IGC (TEC, Art.25). What is 
more, if at least nine states agree, the procedure for enhanced cooperation could be used to 
amend political rights. Thirdly, under another new provision of the Lisbon Treaty, changes to 
the political rights of EU citizens – albeit non-binding – can be also initiated by a citizens’ 
proposal to the Commission (TEU, Art.11). Finally, states can always make a bilateral 
reciprocal adaptation of electoral rights, such as those that already exist between the UK, 
Ireland, Malta and Cyprus, and which does not interfere with the official scope of European 
Union citizenship. 
Conclusions 
Since the mid-1990s, a declining trend of electoral participation in Western countries has 
triggered a wave of discussions about civic education, awareness-raising and new voting 
techniques. Some have argued that turnout fluctuations are valuable per se, as they indicate the 
changing degrees of voter satisfaction or criticism against the government. However, in the case 
of the EU, low voter turnout undermines the representativity of the European Parliament and its 
symbolic importance vis-à-vis the EU citizens and the two other major EU institutions. What is 
more, it damages the image of the Union abroad, especially since democracy and political rights 
are the cornerstone of its foreign policy and development aid. 
One of the main reasons why EU voters abstain is that they don’t understand the role, the 
working procedures and the decisions of the European Parliament. Simplifying the complex EU 
system of accountability is of course one way to settle the problem. Yet, it is hardly plausible  
that this would automatically unleash a substantial rise in electoral participation. On the other 
hand, civic education projects would require large investments over longer periods of time and 
with uncertain results.  
A much simpler solution would be to introduce mandatory EU voting rights and punish 
abstainers with small fines, which would go directly into the EU budget. In countries that 
practise such a system at present, citizens have a higher interest in politics and discuss political 
matters more frequently. As a result politicians address the needs of the entire electorate; they 
campaign on issues rather than on the importance of elections and, in general, spend less money 
on campaigning. From a moral point of view, a legal requirement to vote rehabilitates the notion 
of civic duty, fulfils the principle of universal political rights and realises the democratic ideals 
of participation and equality. If the EU wishes to uphold these principles domestically and 
promote them worldwide, it should indeed take active steps to fulfil them and provide an 
example of democratic ideology and good practice to the world. 
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